The article discusses the concentration of the insurance market in Russia, its influence on the state of insurance in the country and regions. The indicators of the concentration of the insurance market, including by types of insurance, are analyzed, the factors of their changes in the period of 2014–2018 are specified. Predictive estimates of the concentration of the insurance business on the basis of identified trends are given.
In the study of lifestyle, experts appeal to different aspects of life. By “lifestyle,” some people understand only consumer practices, others focus their attention on civic and political activity, and others depict it through objective characteristics of employment, education, and welfare. Considering the existing approaches, here we present a description of the lifestyle in big cities of Russia, using data from various sources – from official statistics to sample household surveys to present a picture in detail. Special attention is paid to the cases of the two federal cities – Moscow and St. Petersburg, as the most striking examples of the formation of a special urban lifestyle in contemporary Russia.
The paper presents the composition of regional social expenditure and the role of regional budgets in public social spending as well as the social burden of regional budgets in Russia in the last decade. Also some problematic issues of regional social spending in Russia are discussed.
The paper discusses the popular use of legal services in the Russian Empire in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Although the studies of popular attitudes towards courts and formal legal were before the collapse of the ancien régime in 1917 abound, they overwhelmingly focus on litigation in low-level judicial settings with very few professional lawyers involved, while the relationship between the members of general public and legal professionals largely remained obscure with the main exception of the state criminals and their public defenders. Therefore, this paper aims to fill the gap by exploring the accessibility of legal services to the various groups of general public along with the ways people interpreted the relationships they had with legal practitioners and the conflicts that sprang from the discrepancy between professional and lay approaches to legal services. The paper focuses on the relationships between general public and the most privileged group of lawyers, named sworn attorneys, which appeared after the reform of legal procedure in the mid-1860s and was entitled to a great deal of professional autonomy, including the right to form partially independent local bar associations. These bar associations were supervised by the elected doyens who could bring disciplinary proceedings against sworn attorneys if they failed to peacefully resolve the disputes with their clients, legal officials or colleagues. Since a disciplinary proceeding usually started with a client complaint about lawyer's professional misconduct, the archives of the bar associations seem to offer a rare look at the professional-client relationship from the perspective of ordinary people. This study draws upon the records of the multiple disciplinary proceedings kept in the archive of the Moscow bar association which encompassed sworn attorneys practising in the Central European provinces of the Empire. The scope of primary sources is narrowed down to the records spanning the well documented period between 1883 and 1902 and representing the situation when clients appeared unsatisfied with the way sworn attorneys argued civil cases on their behalf. As the records show, all social groups, including peasantry, made ample use of legal services provided by sworn attorneys to protect their property rights. Furthermore, the proportion of clients from rural areas was on the steady rise during the observed period. Meanwhile, the complaints tended to fall into two groups. While the first group of complainers believed that sworn attorneys failed to adhere to the formal requirements of the legal procedure and, therefore, lost the cases in question, the second group encompassed those who challenged lawyers' professional expertise blaming the loss on the incomprehension or even incoherent legal arguments sworn attorneys had allegedly put forward in the course of lawsuits. The higher social status a complainer had, the more prone she/he was to the second kind of disputes. Nonetheless, there was one thing that the high-status complainers apparently shared with their counterparts of less affluent backgrounds. Surprisingly, most of the complainers, regardless of their social status, demanded sworn attorneys to repay their litigation costs, assuming that legal practitioners would provide a safety net if a lawsuit resulted in significant financial losses.
Background and aims. Young Russians have been drinking less alcohol, and fewer strong spirits in particular, in recent years. This study aimed to disentangle age, period and birth cohort effects for the first time in Russia to improve our understanding of these trends. Design. Age, period and cohort analysis of annual nationally representative repeated cross-sectional surveys [Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey – Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE)] using separate logistic models for each gender. Setting. Russia 1994–2016. Participants. A total of 195234 respondents aged 14 – 85 years. Measurements. Age (14 groups: 14-17 to 76+ years), period (21 years: 1994–2016) and birth cohorts (17 groups: 1920 –24 to 2000–02). Outcome measures were 30-day overall and beverage-specific alcohol use prevalence accounting for vodka, moonshine, beer and wine. Controls were per capita income, education, marital status, ethnicity, residence type and regional climate. Findings. Controlling for age and period effects, the most recent cohorts had lower rates of participation than older cohorts. Findings were valid for females born in 1995–2002 (P= 0.000) and males born in 1990–94 (P= 0.002) and 1995 –2002 (P= 0.000). The period effects were strong in 1994–2003 due to intensive substitution of beer in place of vodka. Period effects were also important in determining a decline of prevalence in 2008–15 due to restrictive alcohol policy. Age effects showed an inverse U-shaped trend in both genders, except for moonshine and wine. Overall, drinking profiles were beverage-specific. Models indicated diverse beverage-specific effects of income, ethnicity, education, marital status and residence on the prevalence of alcohol use. Conclusion. The recent downward trend in alcohol use in Russia appears to be attributable to reduced participation rates among younger cohorts born after 1990.
Drawing on the all-Russia representative survey data, the given paper aims to study public demand of Russians for the state cooperation to solve their problems in three different fields, as of workfare policies, social investment, and social support. Active labour market policies are mostly demanded by youth that is struggling to access good jobs. Demands for active social support are likely to root in personal situations, particularly, those requiring solving financial and housing issues, which these Russians are not able to tackle themselves, thus demanding transfers from the state.Demands for active social investment policies are more are the most heterogeneous. Independence from the state is typical for the most prosperous part of the population who do not face any serious problems. To meet these diverse demands, the government should differentiate and prioritise the means of social policy.
Recent years have been characterized by a further drop in real incomes of Russians and the spread of pessimism among them regarding their material situation (after a short-term growth of optimistic expectations during the presidential campaign). The current situation in Russia in this area can be described as “negative stabilization”, because, although the decrease in the population’s incomes has stopped, they have stabilized at a lower level than prior to the crisis of 2014–2016. Groups which differ in the dynamics of their material situation starting from 2014 also differ in the specifics of their composition and positions in the system of monetary and especially non-monetary inequalities. The higher an individual’s place in the social hierarchy of life chances, the higher the likelihood of him being in an upward mobility group and the lower the chances of winding up in a group with downward mobility, and vice versa. For the evolution prospects of Russian society’s stratification model this means an increasing polarization of the mass strata of the population. However, so far these processes proceed at a moderate pace and affect the “top” rather than the “bottom” of these strata. The most significant factors determining Russians’ assessments of the dynamics of their material situation are their health, type of locus-control and planning horizon — personal characteristics that affect the ability of developing and implementing effective adaptation strategies. The high importance of personal factors for the dynamics of one’s material situation indicates the crisis nature of modern Russian society, since for crisis societies personal qualities of an individual are more important for the vector of his mobility than structural factors or human and social capital.
The article discusses the processes of precarization, developing rapidly in Russian society, have affected by now a significant portion of the country's population. It is also noted that the formation of precariat raises the question of a possible change in the very grounds (criteria) for distinguishing classes in Russian society, and the nature of employment and degree of social security. A scheme of a possible 5-class structure of Russian society using an approach is offered.
The article presents an analysis of some of the systemic challenges that Russian social policy currently face. It is shown that the functions of social policy in the modern world are much wider than those usually articulated in Russia, and the need to shift from social support to social management is emphasized. The situation with socio-economic inequalities is analyzed; it is shown that the problem of excessive and illegitimate inequalities becomes the most important challenge for the Russian state and its social policy. The significance of this problem is also recognized by the Russians themselves, who consider it even more important than the problem of poverty. Another important systemic challenge is decline in abilities of the population to solve its problems on its own (even with the seeming increase in incomes) due to the “de-farming of the peasantry” and decrease in the social resource of the population, especially among its most vulnerable groups, increase in the debt burden of the middle class, etc. It is emphasized that the further successful and sustainable development of Russia requires an adequate response not only to the challenges described in the article but also to many other systemic challenges.
The paper examines factors and trends of concentration of the population and economy in the capitals of 11 countries of the former Soviet Union. Differences in population concentration dynamics over the post-Soviet period have been identified: partial deconcentration during the crisis-stricken 1990s and accelerated concentration since the 2000s. Strong differences in the concentration of the economy, industry, and investments in these capitals are shown to be largely governed by the size and economic structure of their respective countries. The absence of common trends in concentration of the economy in the capitals is shown. High concentrations of housing construction and retail trade that exceed population concentration have been revealed in almost all the capitals. The degree of personal income inequality in the capitals and in the countries outside the capitals is considered, which mainly determines the directions of labor migration: to capitals or outside the national territory.
The paper observes the main patterns of youth consumption and leisure in contemporary Russia. It relies on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of HSE, a set of nationally representative household-based surveys which includes data collected from 1994 to 2013. The data shows that by 2010 the level of youth consumption has risen along with the households’ overall income and expenditure. The alleviation of financial problems prompted the redistribution of time between work and leisure, so youth turned to the active cultural consumption, including non-entertainment services. However, the total increase in products and services consumed went hand in hand with the rise of differentiation in the availability of durables, patterns of consumption and leisure practices.
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As defined by the OECD and following the international practice, social spending includes all public costs incurred by paying benefits, providing goods and services, as well as tax deductions and discounts, made for social purposes. Among the beneficiaries of these payments and services may be low-income households or certain social groups, such as the retired, disabled, sick and temporarily disabled people, unemployed, and some others. Social spending is generated by such systems as pension plans, healthcare, education (the OECD statistics covers only early childhood education and care), labor market programs, housing, and family policies. This spending is aimed at redistributing resources across households or targets all the citizens and implies compulsory participation. Apart from the definition above, some Russian authors interpret public social spending broader and include funding of the ...
Low oil prices and the recession in Russia which started in 2014 are increasing pressures for fiscal consolidation, after more than a decade of prosperity. This paper assesses the distributional impact of the main tax and social spending programs in Russia in 2014 by applying a state-of-the-art incidence analysis. Overall, the Russian welfare state achieves a moderate reduction in inequality through tax-benefit policies by international standards. Most redistribution occurs through pensions. Major limits on the redistributive effect of tax-benefit policy include the large share of tax revenues that come from (regressive) indirect taxes, the neutral impact of personal income taxes and the low share of spending that goes on social assistance targeted to low-income groups. Tax-benefit policy also has an important impact on the age distribution of income, as households of working-age people (with and without children) subsidize pensioner households.
In Lieu of an Abstract
Youth in Russia has been undergoing massive dynamic changes in terms of marriage and sexuality over the past two decades. This is one of the main factors that determine the norms and trends in contemporary family evolution. These were caused both by universal processes common to all the developed countries, and the huge radical shifts are induced by reforms in the post-Soviet society. Among the most important changes are an increased age of first marriage, a growing divorce rate, an increasing number of single-parent families, a rising extended family ratio (i.e. married couples or mothers with children living with their parents or other relatives) and non-cohabitating married couples. We can identify some other trends, not only in behavior, but also in the perception Russians have of family and marriage (SDDR, 2010: 65–75)…
Social science debates about sources of generalized trust have prompted growingattention to how children develop faith in others. Much of the evidence, however, hascome from relatively stable and prosperous societies. How might children’s trust differin societies that have experienced rapid and destabilizing transitions, as in postcommuniststates? Using new evidence on Russia from three waves of a survey between2006 and 2014, the authors show that children’s trust is relatively low, reflecting lowtrust among parents, children’s sense of economic insecurity, and their doubts aboutthe fairness of key institutions. But rising cohorts since the early 2000s display moretrust than their parents and than their earlier counterparts. Thus old patterns ofdistrust do not necessarily persist intact.
This article (one of a series of two articles) analyzes specific features of income stratification in Russia in comparison with other countries (Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Mexico, China) based on data from several nationwide surveys. It demonstrates that the income stratification model, which refers average per capita incomes at a specific household to the median income in a country, captures well the peculiarities involved in different models of society. It uses the data of an international comparative study, International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), to show that the Russian income stratification model is typical of Europe. At the same time, Russia is in-between Europe and the former Third World in terms of the extent of income inequalities.